카타파시스와 아포파시스를 통한 경험초월적 신성의 표현가능성(expressibility): 위(僞)디오니시오스와 아퀴나스의 신론을 중심으로 Changhyuk Seo ​ Can we use words to justify religious belief? What is religious belief, after all? To justify is to defend, and to defend certain belief we mean by argue for the validity of a set of core premises that constitute the belief in question. For religious belief, the nature of these premises is that they, in the end, point towards what lies beyond the reality─the Divine. The question therefore becomes: Can we use words to argue against or for the Divine? Both Pseudo-Dionysius and Thomas Aquinas deny this in literal sense but agree, although quite distinctive, in significative sense. In this paper, I will attempt to demonstrate that justifying religious belief is possible despite the fact that the language we use is bounded by the rational faculty. Specifically, the expressibility of the Divine and limits of human reason will be discussed by analyzing and contrasting the Pseudo-Dionysian notion of language with that of the Thomistic notion. The divinity, theologically understood, refers to that which exists beyond what is. However, this definition is somewhat misleading, for the Divine, if exists, does exist and therefore cannot exist beyond what is. If we define what is as the set of all existing being, there cannot be an existing being outside this particular set. Therefore, if the Divine is somehow beyond all being, it should be the case that that being is qualitatively distinct from other beings, not that it is not-being. As Aquinas, in 『Summa Theologica』, points out, God is "not said to be 'not there' in the sense that He does not exist at all, but because being His own existence He transcends all that is there."1 This is precisely what Pseudo-Dionysius means when he claims, "beings are surpassed by the infinity beyond being, intelligences by that oneness which is beyond intelligence."2 Thus it logically follows that, since God is beyond being, His essence cannot be understood by human mind.3 The fundamental problem with this, however, is that, if we can only express what we understand, "we can use no words to say what He is."4 Provided that any justification demands argument formulation via linguistic means, the justification of religious propositions is possible if and only if the object of the justification is expressible in words. Nevertheless, according to Aquinas, we arrive at this seemingly hopeless aporia: The Divine cannot be expressed nor delineated by words, for we have "no definition of Him nor has He any accidental attributes by which He might be described. Hence there is no way of referring to God."5 In the context of antique understanding, the true reality does not reside in the material manifestation but beyond it. We encounter here a dichotomized barrier that separates the material language from the things beyond which that language refers to. Any attempt to comprehend that which lies beyond is thus destined to fail. This is observable from as far back as Plato’s attack on anthropomorphic representation of God6 and even from Xenophanes’ criticism on Homer.7 Expressible thoughts thus do not reflect the true nature of divinity: "Indeed the inscrutable One is out of the reach of every rational process. Nor can any words come up to the inexpressible Good ...Mind beyond mind, word beyond speech, it is gathered up by no discourse, by no intuition, by no name."8 Now that we have eliminated the possibility of kataphatic explication of the Divine, we are left with the opposite─the apophatic approach. Both Pseudo-Dionysius and Aquinas agree on the inexpressibility of the Divine. There are, however, conspicuous discrepancies between their positions on methodological apophasis. Let us first consider Pseudo-Dionysian notion of negative theology. Pseudo-Dionysius’ main project is to overcome a paradox of the finite words and undefinable infinity by providing the means of uniting the two through the language of the scripture. We, of course, have seen the inadequacy of words in referring to the Divine. One may rightly point out, for instance, that the scripture, too, makes all sort of kataphatic claims about God. In Old Testament alone, God is represented as the Creator,9 a judge,10 a warrior,11 the Almighty,12 a fortress,13 a refuge,14 and many more. Yet Pseudo-Dionysius simultaneously appeals to the authority of scripture in describing God: Here too let us hold on to the scriptural rule that when we say anything about God, we should set down the truth “not in the plausible words of human wisdom but in demonstration of the power granted by the Spirit” to the scripture writers, ...This is why we must not dare to resort towards or conceptions concerning that hidden divinity which transcends being, apart from what the sacred scripture have divinely revealed.15 According to Pseudo-Dionysius, the Biblical scripture is written through the agency of the power granted by the Spirit which enables us to "reach a union superior to anything available to us by way of our own abilities or activities in the realm of discourse or of intellect."16 For him, scripture is the instantiation of the Good and the Beautiful. While, in 『Phaedrus』, philosophers have privileged status to see the pure ideals, Pseudo-Dionysius maintains that scripture gives us a direct access to a form of episteme beyond anything available to our daily knowledge─it provides the benefits of Platonic madness without becoming insane. Thus scripture, though written in words, reflect the true essence of God. Does this, nevertheless, imply that Pseudo-Dionysius agrees on the legtimacy of kataphatic description of God? Pseudo-Dionysius explicitly notes, "Negative propositions about God are true, but affirmative ones are loose"17 whereas, in 『Divine Names』, we run into his positive characterization of the Divine. Is he contradicting himself? Pseudo-Dionysius recognized the virtue of sola scriptura long before Luther, but he also knew that the scripture, in the end, has its limitation: Since it is the Cause of all beings, we should posit and ascribe to it all the affirmations we make in regard to beings, and more appropriately, we should negate all these affirmations, since it surpasses all being. Now we should not conclude that the negations are simply the opposites of the affirmations, but rather that the cause of all is considerably prior to this, beyond privations, beyond every denial, beyond every assertion.18 Besides the fact that this is a direct rejection of Aristotle who argues that negations are the opposites of affirmations,19 this is also an implicit acknowledgement that the Divine is even above and beyond the apophatic representation. Delineating God, in Pseudo-Dionysius' words, is similar to carving a statue, for sculptors "remove every obstacle to the pure view of the hidden image, and simply by this act of clearing aside they show up the beauty which is hidden."20 For Pseudo-Dionysius, expressing the Divine via negativa is carving the image of God in a way that approximate the genuine form of the Divine. Hence, in Pseudo-Dionysian conception of language, the apophatic interpretation is at least appropriate in explicating God. Thus Pseudo-Dionysius’ apophasis with regard to the abovementioned paradox is at best a means to approximate the Inexpressible. Let us, then, deal with the Thomistic notion of apophasis. Given that God is beyond the domain of human understanding, it follows that He is beyond "the meaning of the names we use."21 It is trivial to state that words point something beyond itself. Every word, indeed, is more than the word itself. When we state that 'something is beautiful', we do not mean that the subject, 'something', is beautiful. Rather, what we mean by this is that the very object, which caused us to use this particular adjective as a predicate in describing that object, pleases our senses. In this case the adjective is not something that refers back to itself, but rather to a certain property of which the object in question appears to possess. Using words to delineate worldly beings does not cause a problem, for the essence of any creature is readily available for a human agent. The problem is that, words, when it comes to the matter of that which lies beyond, cannot fully contain the object that it refers to. Words, in other words, are circumscribed within the expressible boundary. Nonetheless, for Aquinas, this does not eliminate the possibility of kataphatic characterization of God. It is, of course, "the knowledge we have of creatures that enables us to use words to refer to God, and so these words do not express the divine essence as it is in itself."22 They, however, still signify Him: "the expressions we use to name Him signify in a way appropriate to the material creatures we ordinarily know."23 As the comprehensibility of God is contingent upon His grace,24 the expressibility of God is contingent upon the ways in which we signify Him through His creatures.25 This is the imperfect signification. Every creature is the instantiation of and the signification of the Divine. Each manifestation is participatory in the sense that it is saturated by the true ideals. It is in this way that creatures point back toward their creator─the Divine. Aquinas is in this way Platonic. He is Platonic in the sense that behind the material instantiation there is a deeper truth underlying the reality. Aquinas is, nonetheless, at the same time far from Platonism in the way that there is a single Source with which everything participates in. While Platonic metaphysics postulates the multiplicity of forms corresponding each instantiation, the Thomistic conception of methexis emphasizes the unity of the Source in which opposites coincide. There is an intriguing intersection here between Aquinas and Pseudo-Dionysius. Scripture, for Pseudo-Dionysius, is an instantiation of ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, whereas all creature participates in and points towards God in the Thomist system. In arriving at an approximative solution, Pseudo-Dionysius presupposes the single manifestation of the single Source while Aquinas presupposes the multiple manifestation of the single Source. Despite such a subtle difference, there is, of course, a mutual agreement between two philosophers that words partially reveal, in a varying degree, the Divine: In the case of words used of God we may say that the reason they came to be used derives from His causal activity, for our understanding of Him and our language about Him depends on the different perfections in creatures which represent Him, however imperfectly, in His various causal acts.26 As Pseudo-Dionysian understanding of via negativa can be epitomized as a means to approximate the Divine, the Thomistic conceptualization of the imperfect signification is a means to approximate the Divine. The question yet remains─how does the created mind signify, at least approximatively, the Divine? John Damascene asserts, for instance, "The words used of God signify not what He is but what He is not."27 This claim resembles that of Moses Maimonides who insisted that all kataphatic proposition could be reduced to apophatic proposition.28 In Aquinas' view, when interpreted literally, both are implausible, for no words satisfactorily express God. Rather, Aquinas' exposition is precisely what Damascene attempts to demonstrate: Damascene argues so because he, too, postulates "none of them express completely what [God] is; but each signifies imperfectly something that He is, just as creatures represent Him imperfectly."29 For Aquinas, since such representation is achieved via words that make implicit association between the sacred quality of God and the secular quality of the creature that "belongs to a bodily context", it follows that the imperfect signification is hence metaphorical by nature.30 This does not mean, however, as Ambrosius advocates, that all signification is metaphorical,31 for not all metaphorical delineation necessitates a material context. In this way, Aquinas acknowledges the kataphatic illustration of God and believes that Pseudo-Dionysius' apophatic stance is not much different: Pseudo-Dionysius argues that words are better denied of God because "what they signify does not belong to God in the way that they signify it, but in a higher way."32 Both kataphatic and apophatic elucidation of God are limited. Whichever approach we prefer, we end up facing the Inexpressible. Thus, there is no particular reason to denounce the kataphatic statement of God insofar as we know that that affirmative statement is not intended to fully convey the essence of God. The Inexpressible is thus inexpressible. Both kataphatic and apophatic representations of the Divine are, in the end, imperfect signification of God. The Thomistic notion of significative approximation and the Pseudo-Dionysian notion of apophatic approximation are teleologically similar in a way that they point towards the identical Source asymptotically. The only difference lies upon their systematic structures: The latter is analogous to removing the unnecessary components from the statue whereas the former is analogous to unifying the necessary components to form the statue. Either approach seeks to formulate a clearer image of the Divine, but it knows it cannot.33 The Pseudo-Dionysian model of methexis is vertical in a way that the Divine manifests itself in the form of the scripture. The Thomistic model of methexis, on the contrary, is pyramidal in the sense that every creature participates in and unifies itself within the Divine. Hence, considering such hierarchical heterogeneity, the former model is in essence Platonic while the latter is Aristotelian. Such distinctions, in spite of all this, disappear upon the task of expressing the Inexpressible: But my argument now rises from what is below up to the transcendent, and the more it climbs, the more language falters, and when it has passes up and beyond the ascent, it will turn silent completely, since it will finally be at one with Him who is indescribable.34 The presumed distinction between affirmative and negative propositions becomes ephemeral at this point. For neither is adequate in expressing the Inexpressible. Both Pseudo-Dionysius and Aquinas arrive at an approximative solution. But this means that ​any justification of the Divine is also approximative. If we cannot even name the deity nor describe what it is, how can we possibly justify any given proposition with regard to that which lies beyond? Through the scripture? That is a baseless axiomatization─not to mention that this is manifest ad verecundiam fallacy as well as a form of petitio principii. As Lessing demonstrates, a justification through the scripture is valid if and only if the contents of the scripture is certain to the point beyond the historical certainty, for “contingent truths of history can never become the proof of necessary truths of reason.”35 Thus, even if we can trust the Gospel writers, this does not necessarily mean that the scripture can be regarded as a valid reference to the Divine per se, since “the fact that these historians were inspired and could not err is unfortunately likewise only historically certain.”36 Pseudo-Dionysius’ solution, rather surprisingly, concerns the Christ: In a fashion beyond words, the simplicity of Jesus became something complex, the timeless took on the duration of the temporal, and, with neither change nor confusion of what constitutes Him, He came into our human nature, He who totally transcends the natural order of the world.37 Because Christ is a historical figure with bodily forms, Christ, if he is the One as he claims to be, is not only the manifestation of the Divine, but also the incarnated Divine Himself. Thus, as Christ is the sole medium between the sacred and the secular who makes the atonement possible, He is also the sole medium between the Inexpressible and the expressible. God is inexpressible but Christ is expressible precisely because He is “fully God and yet fully human.”38 Nevertheless, in stating that Christ is an explicit manifestation of, or more precisely, an incarnated form of the Divine, Pseudo-Dionysius is presupposing the divinity of Jesus in the first place. But to say that Jesus is the Divine because the scripture proclaims so is a circular reasoning; likewise, to say that the scripture is ecclesiastically approved source with regard to the Divine is appealing to the authority. The matter at hand, however, is whether it is possible to use words in arguing for the religious belief. Apologetics is not of the present concerns. Paul asserts, for instance, “If Christ has not been raised, your faith is futile; you are still in your sins.”39 As long as this particular religious belief is dependent on the resurrection of the bodily Christ, and insofar as the resurrection of Jesus is historically falsifiable event, the justification of religious belief is, at least, possible. The implication of Pseudo-Dionysius’ answer is not that Christianity is based on incontrovertibly manifest premises, but that words may be used to justify the religious belief. Aquinas’ strategy is somewhat straightforward. We have previously seen that not all affirmative statement of God is metaphorical, since the statement such as: (P) God exists. And/Or (Q) God is. Are neither metaphorical nor analogical but literal. Both propositions are affirmative and yet appropriately literal, for they are not necessarily a relational statement which make reference to creatures nor they “signify any particular form, but rather existence itself.”40 The kataphatic statement has previously been assumed inappropriate in describing that which lies beyond what is because the predicate in question was part of the shared properties within creatures as well. In this sense, (P) and (Q) are appropriate if and only if each predicate is used in the universal sense, for “the less determinate our names are and the more general and simple they are, the more appropriately they may be applied to God.”41 Thus by (P) and (Q), we mean: (Q’) God is who He is. Or, more precisely, in St. Augustine’s terminology,42 (*Q’) God is ens per se. By (*Q’) we mean that God is the “Cause of beings”43 and whom nothing can be known except for the fact that He simply is. In the same way Anselm defines God as that-than-which nothing-greater-can-be-thought, Aquinas recognizes that (*Q’) is, at least, if not the most, appropriate name of the Divine. If all existence is sustained by means of λόγος44 and God is λόγος,45 words, insofar as they are universal, can be a medium through which imperfect signification is made possible. If existences is God’s essence and λόγος is a divine way of being, the Divine is, by definition, expressible in virtue of λόγος. Thus, though complete delineation of God is certainly not possible, approximative justification is still possible by affirmation. And, hence, if approximative justification is possible, regardless of how satisfying the justification in question is, it is possible. A paradox of the finite words and undefinable infinity can thus be solved. As God’s alpha and omega lie upon its existence,46 we began the discussion with the problem of existence and ended the discussion with the existence as a solution. The Inexpressible is inexpressible in the literal sense. But the Inexpressible is expressible in the significative sense. Pseudo-Dionysius achieves this via apophatic approximation and Thomas Aquinas achieves this via kataphatic approximation. Words can never wholly contain the Inexpressible, but words can still be used to justify the religious belief either, and insofar as when (1) the Divine is metamorphosed into the material form, as in the case of the incarnation, so that one can passively express the Divine, or (2) existence is actively assumed as the fundamental essence of the Divine, allowing the kataphatic proposition in describing God. Hence, that which lies beyond can be, at least, pointed to. And, if that which lies beyond can be pointed to, however imperfectly, we can signify it by means of approximative language. Thus, voila! Finite words and infinite logos converge at last─a lingua-metaphysical rendezvous. D. Bibliography Aquinas, Thomas. Summa Theologica. Translated and edited by Herbert McCabe. London: Cambridge University Press, 2006. Colm Luibheid, and Paul Rorem, ed. Pseudo-Dionysius: The Complete Works. London: Society for the Promotion of Christian Knowledge, 1987. Cooper, John M., ed. Plato: Complete Works. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1997. Edghill, E. M. De Interpretatione. Whitefish: Kessinger Publishing, 2004. Hardon, John. Modern Catholic Dictionary. Danvers: Image Books, 2013. Lessing, Gotthold E. Philosophical and Theological Writings. London: Cambridge University Press, 2005. McKirahan, Richard D. Philosophy before Socrates. Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Co., 1994. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, trans. Herbert McCabe (London: Cambridge University Press, 2006). Ia.12.1. ad. 3. Colm Luibheid and Paul Rorem, ed., Pseudo-Dionysius: The Complete Works. (London: Society for the Promotion of Christian Knowledge, 1987). 588B. Aquinas, Summa Theologica., Ia.12.7. co. Ibid., Ia.13.2. pr. 3. Ibid., Ia.13.1. pr. 3. John M. Cooper, ed., Plato: Complete Works. (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1997), 246d. Richard D. McKirahan, Philosophy before Socrates. (Indianapolis and Cambridge; Hackett Publishing Co., 1994), B11-16. Luibheid and Rorem, ed., Pseudo-Dionysius: The Complete Works., 588B. Genesis 14:19. Genesis 18:25. Exodous 15:3. Job 40:2. Psalm 31:3. Isaiah 25:4. Luibheid and Rorem, ed., Pseudo-Dionysius: The Complete Works., 585B-588A. Ibid., 588A. Aquinas, Summa Theologica., Ia.13.12. pr. 1. Luibheid and Rorem, ed., Pseudo-Dionysius: The Complete Works., 1000B. E. M. Edghill, De Interpretatione. (Whitefish: Kessinger Publishing, 2004), 17a 31-33. Luibheid and Rorem, ed., Pseudo-Dionysius: The Complete Works., 1025B. Aquinas, Summa Theologica., Ia.13.1. ad. 1. Ibid., Ia.13.1. co. Ibid., Ia.13.1. ad. 2. Ibid., Ia.12.5. co.; Luibheid and Rorem, ed., Pseudo-Dionysius: The Complete Works, 588D. Aquinas, Summa Theologica., Ia.12.5. co. Ibid., Ia.13.2. ad. 2. Ibid., Ia.13.2. pr. 1. Ibid., Ia.13.2. co. Ibid., Ia.13.2. ad. 1. Ibid., Ia.13.3. pr. 3. Ibid., Ia.13.3. arg. Ibid., Ia.13.3. ad. 2. Ibid., Ia.13.12. ad. 1.; Luibheid and Rorem, ed., Pseudo-Dionysius: The Complete Works., 1033B. Luibheid and Rorem, ed., Pseudo-Dionysius: The Complete Works., 1033C. Gotthold E. Lessing, Philosophical and Theological Writings. (London: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 85. Ibid., 87. Luibheid and Rorem, ed., Pseudo-Dionysius: The Complete Works., 592A-B. Hebrews 2:5-18. 1 Corinthians 15:17. Aquinas, Summa Theologica., Ia.13.11. co. Ibid. John Hardon, “Substance,” Modern Catholic Dictionary. (Danvers: Image Books, 2013), 523. Colm Luibheid, and Paul Rorem, ed., Pseudo-Dionysius: The Complete Works., 592A. Genesis 1:1-31. John 1:1. Revelation 1:8. 저작자 명시 필수 영리적 사용 불가 내용 변경 불가 공감 5 이 글에 공감한 블로거 열고 닫기 댓글 쓰기 이 글에 댓글 단 블로거 열고 닫기 카페 보내기Keep 보내기메모 보내기기타 보내기 펼치기 수정 삭제 설정